Downloaded from YTS.MX
(soft rumbling, growing louder)
Official YIFY movies site: YTS.MX
♪ ♪
(waves crashing)
ZIPPORAH KURIA: I remember the first time I ever stepped into the ocean.
My brothers jumped in, my mom jumped in, and I just stayed away from the waves.
And I remember my dad pretending to drown, and he was like,
"Who's gonna help me? Who's gonna help me?
Only my little girl can help me."
He had the ability to empower me to think
that my six-year-old body could lift a whole man.
The world has really lost
the best kind of people...
...on that flight.
(jet engine whirring)
(upbeat electronic music playing)
WOMAN: My colleague with communications, John Flick,
is with some of the employees that have come,
and certainly there are a lot here in Renton, Washington,
but we have employees who've been involved
with this airplane and program from all over the globe.
-John? -FLICK: Deborah, certainly it is
a worldwide effort, and, you know, not the greatest day.
It's rainy, it's cold, but look at all the excited faces.
-(crowd whooping) -A lot of these folks from Renton here,
ponchos, smiling, even though it's raining.
And we talked about the team effort for this.
WOMAN: Let's just take a listen
as this airplane gets ready for its very first takeoff.
(applause)
(jet engine roaring)
(crowd whooping)
♪ ♪
(cameras clicking)
(typewriter clacking)
DENNIS MUILENBURG: Throughout the past 100 years,
Boeing and its employees have led with innovation...
...and have taken the world from seaplanes to space planes.
From walking on the Earth...
...to walking on the Moon.
(satellite beeping)
Few companies have achieved as much as we have.
Today, we'll celebrate that legacy together
while imagining what comes next.
NEWSMAN: One Dow stock is skyrocketing, and it's a familiar one.
NEWSWOMAN: Shares of Boeing stock is on pace for its best month ever.
(bell clanging)
I'm speaking to you from the Boeing plant in Everett, Washington,
because at this plant, they're building the plane of the future.
CROWD (chanting): U.S.A.! U.S.A.! U.S.A.!
-U.S.A. -U.S.A.! U.S.A.!
MUILENBURG: We're the leader in this great global industry,
and we know that lives literally depend on what we do.
We will continue to lead and succeed in our second century.
(applause)
DOMINIC GATES: I believe in the Boeing mission.
I'm awed by their technology and their prowess.
I love it.
And it's a hugely important company, and I want it to succeed.
This is the piece that we wrote that blew open the story
behind the 737 MAX disasters.
I remember somebody called me up and said, "Why didn't you publish that earlier?
Maybe you could've stopped the second crash."
♪ ♪
(soft rumbling)
(water burbling)
(helicopter whirring)
(man speaking foreign language)
NEWSWOMAN: An Indonesia passenger plane
crashing into the sea minutes after takeoff from Jakarta.
All 189 people on board are now feared dead.
♪ ♪
Mentioned this was a-a Boeing aircraft.
What m-more do we know about the plane?
NEWSMAN: (stammers) Boeing, as you said, uh, almost brand-new.
They had taken delivery of it back in August.
It was a 737 MAX.
That's the updated version of the 737. They haven't been out that long.
NEWSMAN 2: The stock is down, but my read is that TheStreet
actually isn't that negative on where Boeing is going with this issue.
NEWSWOMAN 2: Analysts have great expectations for their stock.
-(siren wailing) -The company said the crash had posed
no material risk to the MAX program,
the company has enough cash flow to cover this,
and that this issue again is overblown.
(people crying)
MUILENBURG: First of all, I think it's important that we all
express our sympathies for the-the loss of, uh, Lion Air Flight 610.
Uh, we've been very engaged with the investigative authorities throughout
in providing all of the information, uh, necessary
to make sure we do a full assessment of, uh, of the situation.
And the bottom line here is the 737 MAX is safe.
(birds squawking)
(helicopter whirring)
NEWSWOMAN: We are following breaking news out of Ethiopia,
where a plane went down, killing everyone on board.
NEWSWOMAN 2: The airline told state media
there were people of more than 30 nationalities among the dead.
NEWSWOMAN 3: It's unclear what caused the crash,
but the model in question, a Boeing 737 MAX 8,
it's the same one that was involved in the Indonesian disaster back in October.
NEWSWOMAN 4: This has now moved into a criminal probe.
The Justice Department issuing multiple subpoenas
as part of a wide-ranging investigation into Boeing's FAA certification.
(thunder rumbling)
NEWSMAN: Facing serious safety questions and brutal political headwinds,
the Boeing 737 MAX 8 is being grounded around the globe.
(reporters speaking various languages)
DONALD TRUMP: Any plane currently in the air
will go to its destination and thereafter be grounded.
NEWSWOMAN 5: Is this expected to send shock waves through the U.S. economy?
NEWSMAN 2: It certainly could.
You're talking about tens of thousands of supply chain workers.
That's in addition to the 12,000 Boeing employees who build the 737.
-(reporters clamoring) -TRUMP: It was a big-- that was a big decision.
-It's also one of our largest exporters. -(cameras clicking)
One of the truly great companies of the world.
They have to figure it out fast.
♪ ♪
GATES: These were two brand-new airplanes that crashed,
and the weather was perfect.
That just shouldn't happen.
Why did they crash?
Was there a common cause?
Were the pilots somehow at fault?
Or was there something wrong with the plane?
KURIA: I'm smart.
OLIVIA: I'm smart.
KURIA: I'm intelligent.
(babbles)
I'm kind.
Kind.
I'm funny.
I'm funny. (babbles)
I'm beautiful!
-I'm beautiful. -Good girl.
(happy babbling)
♪ ♪
KURIA: They say you usually start your grieving process
when you've buried your loved one.
Then you get news that they've identified some remains.
And finding out you're getting like 30%
of the man who raised you.
Some families got 70%, 80%.
My brothers, my niece
and the rest of our family,
we only got 30%.
Going through the list of remains, viewing, like, what's in the casket.
You know, it was hard to digest.
NEWSWOMAN: The families of some of the 157 people killed
when a Boeing 737 MAX
crashed in Ethiopia last March have accused
Ethiopian Airlines of denying them the chance
to attend a service for their loved ones at the site of the disaster.
NEWSMAN: Yesterday, the final unidentifiable remains of those who died
were buried at the site.
Two days before the burial, they send the families an email,
saying, "We're going to be burying your loved ones in the next 48 hours."
They were just buried like people who didn't belong to anyone
or weren't loved by anyone.
My dad had a funeral yesterday, and I missed it.
(wind whistling softly)
♪ ♪
NEWSWOMAN: Do you believe that Boeing has been
transparent enough in the process so far?
We may actually be in litigation against Boeing out of this cris--
so I don't want to throw stones at Boeing until we know more.
(train horn blows in distance)
JUSTIN GREEN: Boeing's got the best aviation lawyers,
trial lawyers.
They've got unlimited resources.
And the families of the victims
-essentially have us. -(train horn blows)
(whoops)
I was a pilot in the Marine Corps.
I've been in two aviation crashes.
The first one was in a DC-9.
It broke in half when it landed in Pensacola.
The second one, the cross-tube broke, the rotor blades hit the ground
and flipped the helicopter.
The accident I was in, nothing compared to the two MAX crashes.
Those passengers didn't have a chance.
So, on the 6th, we have Konjit.
ANNE HABIG: And then Linet.
She has two hours to meet with you.
GREEN: There's two sides of the case, and they're both equally important.
The first one is the liability case.
She may not come now. She's all worried.
GREEN: Yeah, I saw the emails.
Basically, we have to prove that Boeing did something wrong
in order to hold Boeing accountable.
HABIG: She left behind a husband and two little-- and two minor children.
But they haven't given me a date yet.
GREEN: The second thing is compensation.
Even though life is precious and life can't be measured in terms of money,
that is how the law measures it.
And the compensation that we seek from Boeing
has to reflect the very serious losses our clients have suffered.
(indistinct chatter)
Boeing will try to put people on a spreadsheet.
WOMAN: Hello.
GREEN: Have name, age, relatives.
(woman speaking foreign language)
And then they might say, "Well, that's a single person,
"not survived by a spouse, no kids.
That case isn't worth a lot of money."
So one of the things we do is we kind of take them off that chart.
"Yeah, that person's not married,
but did you know the person supported his entire family?"
-(indistinct chatter) -(woman crying)
KONJIT SHAFI BALEKER: He completed all the six years training
and then he become Africa key instructor.
GREEN: In this case, our client's a young man,
who, in the entire country of Ethiopia,
he's the only person who can actually instruct master technicians
on Toyota vehicles.
BALEKER: He wins a national contest in 2011,
also in thou-- 2012.
Everything here is a memorial of Sintayehu.
Everything.
My mother still expect, every night,
to open the door for him.
To say hi to him.
She wakes up early to prepare a food to him.
It's difficult to accept the reality still.
GREEN: You don't let people become numbers.
You make them people again.
So what we have to do is try to get the essence of the person.
ABABU AMEHA: This is, uh, when she was graduating from ET.
-Oh. -Yeah.
As a cabin crew, when she was joined.
This is the wings that they wore?
AMEHA: This is the wing for the crew members.
Her intention was to run her own business.
-GREEN: Right. -Yeah.
And she was doing it in addition to raising kids,
having a full-time flight attendant position.
AMEHA: Yeah.
-GREEN: She had a lot of energy, huh? -Yeah.
-This is her attorney. -The image I found.
AMEHA: My wife, she used to drink wine while she had
helping of spaghetti.
So this is her last drink.
This is her last drink.
Nobody has touched it.
We need justice.
GREEN: Um, could you just tell me what your full name is?
I am John Quindos.
Can I ask you about the crash
and the loss of your wife, uh, your daughter and-and your three grandchildren?
QUINDOS: It is, uh... it's a bit difficult to explain.
Every day, you wake up
and you find you have nowhere to go.
It comes to your mind,
"My God, why did you do this?"
GREEN: We make them, you know, put together photos for us.
We make them fill out questionnaires for us.
We put the people through pain.
Can you just tell me what you miss the most about your mom?
♪ ♪
It's emotionally draining.
And, um, making everything much worse,
you could have a case where someone from the U.S.
gets ten times what someone from outside the U.S. gets.
And this is something that we've been fighting for years.
I'm so sorry.
-And, God, thank you for having us. -Thank you.
One of the families said, "You know what?
"If you bring me a billion dollars and you say,
"'You can have this billion dollars
or my brother back,' I'm gonna take my brother."
Um, so getting the money, is that justice?
ELYAB TILAHUN: I mean, I-I won't even
begin to understand what they're going through.
One minute, these people, they were, they were with you,
and then, 20 minutes later, you're-you're being told that
there was a plane crash and they've all died.
How do you make peace with that?
(seagulls chirping)
(ship horn blowing)
WOMAN: Morning. Hi.
-Hello. Good morning. -(busy chatter)
Yeah, come in.
MAN (over speakers): We're gonna have some folks coming in late.
We'll just have to find a seat.
Hey, there's Dominic. You made it.
WENDY SOWERS: Of the 20 largest airlines in the world,
19 of them fly the Triple Seven.
We talked about ten percent better costs per seat
than our closest competitor currently in the market today.
We also have double-digit improvement in efficiency,
so this allows them to reduce their costs.
Happy to take some questions of the room.
-Yes? -Can we get an interview about the MAX?
SOWERS: Uh...
We can work with you on any MAX-related questions.
Wendy's really the marketing Triple Seven X person.
I don't think she'd be in a position to answer
any real complicated MAX questions, right?
SOWERS: Yeah, and I'm not an engineer, so...
-MAN: And she's not an engineer. -(woman laughs)
Okay, so we're gonna proceed out of here. Head out of the door.
Head toward-- straight to the buses.
GATES: I always say to Boeing that it's better if you work with me.
But if you don't and you try to close me out,
well, I'll write it without you.
♪ ♪
For 17 years now, I've been covering the story of Boeing.
Joining us now is Dominic Gates, an aerospace reporter for The Seattle Times.
Behind me here, we've got the 737
fuselage system installation.
This is the most journalistically competitive story I've ever worked on.
Sorry, everybody. Sorry I'm late.
And so every meeting we were having...
You know that a lot of people are gonna be reading it or not...
GATES: The editors were saying, "Whatever you got, get it out there fast."
There are two great centers of airplane building in the world:
Toulouse in Europe for Airbus
and Seattle for Boeing.
Historically, you did pay a premium for a Boeing plane.
And that's because it was better built.
I don't think that's true anymore.
I mean, it-it began with the McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997.
The merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas is now complete.
GATES: And, in a sense, the MAX crashes
are the end point of that.
All these McDonnell Douglas people came with this different mentality.
They didn't want to design new planes
and just harvested the money from these older models.
The new management sold Wall Street this vision
of Boeing growing exponentially, and Wall Street bought it.
But they were also under intense competitive pressure from Airbus.
-Yeah. -That's right.
Airbus kept building new planes,
and suddenly American Airlines was about to seal a huge order
for 200 A320neos,
which is the rival of the 737.
NEWSMAN: Is Boeing in trouble, do you think?
It tells us that the-the company's in some trouble in its competition with Airbus.
GREEN: American Airlines was a legacy
Boeing customer who only flew, uh, Boeing products up to that time.
So the idea that they would lose market share to, um, Airbus
was a major event.
GATES: So what's Boeing going to do to answer Airbus?
RAY RIVERA: They were going to design a whole new airplane,
and then scrapped those plans and decided to modify
-the 737 in that race. -Right.
DANIEL ROSE: And the thinking for that was time,
-money? -GREEN: Time.
It's a lot easier to get a new version of a already certified aircraft
certified by the FAA.
But the primary goal was that Boeing wanted to produce the airplane
so they could sell it to customers who were already flying the 737
and say, "Look, if an airline is looking at either buying an Airbus,
"where they'd have to put pilots through training,
"or buy the 737 MAX, where they already have the pilots certified,
that's a huge competitive advantage."
MICHELE MATASSA FLORES: The biggest picture of all is really
the expectations in a capitalist society, right?
There's shareholders, who want greater return all the time.
There are flying passengers, who want lower prices all the time.
That's really what drives all of this.
MARC MOLLER: Pull the curtain back
and see what's really going on in this company,
and you'll understand why this plane crashed.
ED PIERSON: Over here, this was not supposed to be a big parking lot for 737s,
but that's what it's become right now where they're grounded.
It's, uh, heartbreaking.
(birds chirping)
The 737 factory, it's a huge facility.
My team worked on the factory floor,
and we started seeing a lot of quality issues.
And that's when I was expressing my concerns to the general manager.
♪ ♪
Problems started when senior executives
were really trying to ramp up production of the MAX.
The plan is to build these planes in a very organized way
'cause it's a complicated product and you have to do everything right.
And because of this pressure, this continued pressure to produce,
because of Airbus,
we're not doing that.
MUILENBURG: We're seeing a lot of, uh, narrow-body interest,
so of course, uh, this week, we'll be highlighting the MAX family.
NEWSMAN: Cameras captured a great week for Boeing in orders and commitments.
MAN: Singapore Airlines has committed to 30,
-United Airlines to 20. -(cameras clicking)
GATES: The MAX was very successful.
It's the fastest-selling Boeing jet ever.
MUILENBURG: We got about 4,000
737s in backlog.
We're oversold.
PIERSON: We were going from building 47 planes in a month to 52.
That's a lot of airplanes.
MUILENBURG: Every one and a half seconds,
a 737 takes off
-somewhere in the world. -MAN 2: Right, and...
-So, there goes another one. -All right. -(laughter)
So we would try to meet schedule, and-and it started slipping.
NEWSMAN 2: AerCap announced an order for 100 737 MAX 8s.
MAN 3: Well, it's looking pretty good. Looks like, uh, another record year.
PIERSON: Now we're having to do work out of sequence,
which adds risk.
NEWSMAN 3: Take a look at shares of Boeing.
MUILENBURG: Over the next 20 years,
we see a need for about 41,000 new airplanes.
MAN 4: I'm about ready to move again.
So I just move my pad, and I have to keep pace, keep up.
PIERSON: I've never seen that kind of pressure put on people.
And they started getting grilled, you know, "How--
"I thought you gave me your word you were gonna be done yesterday, and your team--
How come you're not off the plane?" And somebody would make this mistake,
and then the same mistake would be made a day or two later.
Y-You don't want people thinking like that when they're building airplanes.
I wrote a letter to the CEO saying, "We could still do the right thing,
but we need to stop and give our people a chance to catch up."
I wrote to the board of directors, and I requested their assistance.
"Yeah, we'll get in touch with you." "We'll get back to you."
Nothing, nothing.
We'll meet this demand, always raising the bar
when it comes to safety, quality and integrity.
(sighs)
(crickets chirping)
PIERSON: I do know that, you know, there might be people
that will try to discredit me or maybe challenge what I say, you know,
and my response back is, "Look, I have to do it."
♪ ♪
I need to explain that even a wonderful, great company like Boeing
can have problems.
ERIC HAVIAN: There are many unfortunate circumstances involving whistleblowers.
Edward Snowden, he now lives in-in Russia.
Chelsea Manning ended up in prison.
Been a long road to get here, huh?
HAVIAN: Yeah, too long. (chuckles)
Those are the names that you hear about,
but there are many other whistleblowers trying to speak out to make a difference.
Doing okay, honey?
I'm doing okay.
HAVIAN: Ed's going up against Boeing,
one of the biggest employers in Seattle area,
and there are some very well documented examples
where Boeing has retaliated against people who have gone against the company.
-Thank you, sir. -Thank you.
(elevator bell dings)
Going down here. Down here?
-CYNTHIA McFADDEN: Hi. -Hi. How are you, Cynthia?
Thank you for coming and doing this.
Thanks for inviting me. Appreciate it.
Very good. So let's, um, let's ask the documentary team to go.
So, the name's out.
The Wall Street Journal is the one who got the leak.
Right.
HAVIAN: Someone leaked Ed's identity,
and now the press are calling Boeing, and Boeing is preparing to say something.
I can't answer questions like that ever on behalf of the client,
whether the answer is yes or no.
People want to protect Boeing's flank.
They think it's in their interest to have Boeing get out there first
before Ed's story is told.
But of course, I know you don't want to do that.
In order for that not to happen, um,
looks like the stories will go today rather than tomorrow.
(whispers): I'm trying.
Never a dull moment.
McFADDEN: After 30 years in the military, much of it spent in an airplane,
Ed Pierson has a strong sense of duty.
Bottom line is you're worried about people dying in Boeing planes.
Yeah, absolutely.
McFADDEN: But in late 2017,
Ed Pierson says he started to see things that alarmed him.
(elevator bell dings)
What words would you use to describe that factory at that point?
PIERSON: Dangerous.
Um, unnecessary.
Taking unnecessary risks.
Chaotic. Uh, um, disarray.
McFADDEN: Four months later, a Lion Air 737 MAX
(over TV): crashed, killing all 189 people on board.
What do you say to Americans who are planning to fly on a 737?
I would demand that the FAA, in their role as regulators,
go in, thoroughly investigate that factory.
LESTER HOLT: So, Cynthia, what is Boeing saying about all this?
McFADDEN: Well, Lester, while the 737 MAX fleet are all grounded,
there are more than 6,800 other 737s flying.
Now, Boeing is pushing back strongly tonight,
saying that the 737 is one of the safest planes flying, and they say, quote,
"...the suggestion by Mr. Pierson of a link between his concerns
and the recent MAX accidents is completely unfounded."
And they say, so far, no investigators have found, quote,
"...production conditions in the factory contributed to the accidents."
Lester.
-(indistinct chatter) -(birds chirping)
PETER DeFAZIO: After the first crash, Boeing told us it was a one-off.
The initial reports on the second crash
sounded identical to what happened in the first crash.
And that just set off alarm bells with me, saying, "No, wait a minute.
Uh, there's something we don't know here."
And that was when we began the investigation.
Almost like a court proceeding, we-- first you go into discovery.
You need the documents.
And then, once you get the documents,
you identify, uh, key players who need to be interviewed.
-(cameras clicking) -Morning.
MUILENBURG: Good morning. Good to be here with you this morning.
Uh, thank you.
Looking forward to, uh, today's hearing.
REPORTER: They're gonna ask you, apparently, about a manager
who sought to halt the production of the 737 MAX today.
Did you know about anything like that?
And what would your response be to that now?
Aware of that, and we've, uh, taken on those concerns
and address-- have addressed those.
-(reporters clamoring) -Thank you. Thank you.
DeFAZIO: I want to return to the market pressures,
the fact that you had to design a plane that was more economical
and couldn't require pilot training.
I was taking on a very powerful corporation.
Mr. Chairman, we'll follow up with that information.
DeFAZIO: They were resistant.
Is anybody at Boeing taking a cut
or working for free to try to rectify this problem?
My, uh, board will conduct a comprehensive review that's...
So you're saying you're not giving up any compensation at all?
You're continuing to work and make $30 million a year?
DeFAZIO: But we're gonna see through with the investigation.
We think the system is gonna work.
NEWSMAN: Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg testified before a Senate committee.
Boeing came to my office shortly after these crashes
and said they were the result of pilot error.
Those pilots never had a chance.
MUILENBURG: When we design a system,
understand that these airplanes are flown in the hands of pilots,
and in some cases, our system safety analysis includes
not only the engineering design but also
the actions that, uh, pilots would take as part of, uh, a failure scenario.
GATES: Blame the dead pilots.
I-I'm continually astonished that Boeing won't move from that.
Especially once I started digging up information about
the MAX's new flight control system, which is called the MCAS--
the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System.
Hey, it's Dominic.
Uh, you got a minute?
The name of it is an awful acronym that tells you nothing.
I find it astonishing that you don't know about it.
All we knew early on was that MCAS was new flight control software
that had been added to the MAX
and that some flaw in it had caused the crash.
(jet engine whirring)
GREEN: There's a big question about how this airplane was designed.
The history of this is freaking crazy.
So the whole thing goes way back to, like, the '60s.
MALE ANNOUNCER: Newest arrival in the Boeing family of airliners,
the 737 attracts a crowd.
GREEN: They want a short jet.
They want a jet that people can get onto and off of on a stairway,
so they build the 737 low to the ground.
So then, fast-forward to 2011...
...they tacked on two new engines.
The size of the engines meant they're gonna be dragging on the ground,
so they put them forward and up.
The new engines are so big that the air gets underneath
and gives it an extra bit of lift, so software automatically counters that.
A sensor feeds the flight control computer,
and MCAS swivels the tail,
pushing the jet's nose down.
But the system was just too strong.
Before the first crash, the pilot began a fight
against this system that he didn't know about,
pulling the nose up, and he did it 26 times.
And the plane was going in a roller-coaster ride.
(jet engine roaring)
WOMAN (over P.A.): Flight 892 is...
GATES: I actually talked to pilots,
and they had a totally different story.
Before the second crash, Boeing sent a senior vice president
down to American Airlines
to brief the pilot union.
And that turned into a pretty rough meeting.
DAN CAREY: I wasn't going to stay in the meeting.
It was the first time Boeing visited APA headquarters.
When we saw the list of the Boeing personnel coming,
the one thing that really jumped off the page
was they were bringing their lawyer, so...
I mean, who brings a lawyer to a safety meeting?
I just sensed that they were not being direct or forthright.
So, anyway, I just thought it would be beneficial to record the meeting.
MAN (recorded): So I-I guess what I'll start with, then, is the control law
that is referred to in the press right now called MCAS.
So it's just a little bit of software in the flight control system.
Obviously, in the accident a couple of weeks ago,
it's been reported that the system misbehaved.
I keep hearing those words, "little," "little bit," "misbehave."
It was like they were describing it as a child.
MAN (recorded): You know, a million miles you're going to fly this airplane,
and maybe once you're going to see this ever.
So we try not to overload the crews with information that's unnecessary.
And I don't know that understanding this system
would have changed the outcome of this.
They didn't come in and go, "Look,
"you've only got a handful of seconds to get this right.
"Okay, we didn't tell you about it. We're very sorry.
"But we want you to know going forward that if you react quickly and get on this,
that it's manageable."
They didn't. They were like, "Look, you know what to do."
NEWSWOMAN: Just minutes from now, lawmakers on Capitol Hill will hear from
pilots who have criticized Boeing in the wake of these two deadly crashes.
NEWSMAN: I know Sully will be the movie star in the room,
but really look for Dan Carey.
He's the head of the Allied Pilots Association.
As pilots know, improvements in aviation are often-- too often--
written in the blood of the unfortunate victims of these airplane accidents.
I got a subpoena from Congress, so I released the tape.
I knew there would be some pretty heavy consequences.
NEWSMAN 2: This audio recording, more than anything else,
has raised the specter of doubt about the company and this aircraft.
This is the first unscripted moment we have heard from Boeing.
CAREY: It was important for me to get that tape out,
and then I immediately turned it over to Chairman DeFazio.
DeFAZIO: There were many false warnings simultaneously?
SULLY SULLENBERGER: Yes.
A single fault, a single failure
can now have cascading effects rapidly through multiple systems.
THOMAS MASSIE: Do you think that better trained pilots
should've been able to handle the malfunctions?
You have to remember, uh, sir, and members of the panel,
this is a sudden, violent and terrifying event.
This airplane's pitching up and down, rapidly and violently.
There's bells, uh, warnings and clackers, uh, sounding.
Again, the failure was that they didn't ever tell us the system existed,
so therefore we did not have robust training.
WOMAN: I'd like first, the family members who are on,
that they could unmute themselves and introduce themselves
so that the media knows who is, uh, who's on.
Suzanne Camp. I'm the mother of Micah Messent.
I'm, uh, Matthieu Willm. I lost my sister.
Tom Kabau. We lost our younger brother.
My name is Paul Njoroge.
I lost my wife and my three children
and my mom-in-law in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines.
MAN: He was traveling to Kenya.
Nairobi would have been, uh, just a, just a little stop,
and she never arrived.
My name is Zipporah Kuria,
and I lost my dad.
(gearshift clicks)
(elevator beeping)
KURIA: Go up. Go.
Stop right there.
Yeah, if we, if we can edit this.
If it-- if we just put, "For the first six minutes,
"the pilot struggled to control the 737 MAX 8
before it then crashed."
I'm a bit younger than most of the family members,
so we're all just kind of streamlining our different skill.
I kind of know how to work social media and for the website.
-My favorite feature is the "Our Stories" page. -Mm.
KURIA: We are family.
Like, we're the ET302 family whether we want to be part of it or not.
In a way, it's like they shared... shared blood.
-(blows) -(laughs)
(laughter)
DARCY BELANGER: Hi. Good morning, everyone.
It is an early start today.
I am in Washington, D.C., on a layover.
I'm heading to the United Nations Environment Assembly.
Uh, so, uh, I'll check in again.
We don't know where I'll be-- maybe Ethiopia,
maybe my final destination, Kenya--
but I'll keep you posted on the journey.
Have a great day.
KURIA: You can see the stories of, like, my dad, Joseph Kuria Waithaka,
age 55, and you can see a little bit about him and who he was.
Hi, guys.
This is me and Olivia's diary of "Don't take your family to your gym."
Dad, how many calories have you burnt now?
-WAITHAKA: 31. -31 only?
And how long have you been doing it for?
(whispers): He doesn't like it.
How long have you been doing it for?
♪ ♪
I remember dreaming about my dad screaming for me,
being sat next to him on the plane, but his section falling
and me trying to reach out and grab him.
I wonder how the people who were behind making the decisions go to sleep at night.
(voice breaking): I can count how many nights I go to sleep
and just have clean sleep
without imagining what was happening
in those last six minutes of my dad's life.
Like seeing the ground coming toward you so close.
(jet engine rumbling, fading)
♪ ♪
NEWSMAN: Tonight, a rare and stark admission of fault
from the world's biggest airplane maker.
MUILENBURG: We at Boeing are sorry
for the lives lost in the recent 737 MAX accidents.
The Boeing argument was,
"We've informed everybody how to handle it,
and we're working on a software fix which we will have very soon."
NEWSMAN 2: Boeing says MAX pilots can learn the new system in just 30 minutes.
That's-that's just ridiculous.
We're taking a comprehensive, disciplined approach
and taking the time to get the software update right.
We're nearing completion and anticipate its certification and implementation
on the 737 MAX fleet worldwide in the weeks ahead.
We remain confident in the fundamental safety of the 737 MAX.
(birds chirping)
PIERSON: People think that the problem was only software,
but Boeing is controlling the narrative: "Look here. Don't look here."
It's easier for them to talk about pilot training,
'cause they can blame it on human mistakes,
and the software, 'cause we'll just make a software patch
and we'll send it out, you know,
but there's other issues,
unanswered questions that are not being addressed.
Why did the plane crash?
It crashed 'cause the pilots lost control.
Why did the pilots lose control?
'Cause MCAS software was pitching the plane down repeatedly.
Why was that happening?
'Cause the angle of attack sensor failed.
But why'd the sensor fail?
People think it's software, but it's actually hardware.
It's a three-pound physical part
that's been installed on hundreds if not thousands of planes.
GATES: The angle of attack is the angle
basically between the wing and the incoming airflow,
and the angle of attack sensor was giving a wrong signal.
In fact, it was giving an impossible signal.
GREEN: 74.5 degrees nose up.
ROSE: Isn't 74 degrees, like,
beyond the pale of any normal...
GREEN: You're right. An airplane can't fly at 74.5 de--
You'd have to be a rocket ship.
ROSE: So even though the plane was flying
at a safe angle of attack, because of this bad sensor,
the MCAS system thought it was higher up like that
and was programming the nose to go down.
If this was truly the-the angle of attack, they've got...
-Bigger problems. (chuckles) -They got way bigger problems.
PIERSON: The MAX was not the only plane being built at the factory.
Makes you wonder: Are there other sensors out there that have the same defect?
And so, if that's all they're gonna do-- fix the software and the pilot training--
then I think the flying public needs to ask why.
GATES: Whistleblowers from inside Boeing stepping forward
has always been my best source of information.
Over the years, that's how I've learned
what's really going wrong inside the company.
I'm for the little guy.
I'm not for-- obviously, for the large, powerful corporation.
So-- That I know has severe problems internally.
GATES: Gerry Eastman approached me in 2003,
years before the MAX crashes,
angry about how management was running the company into the ground
and about safety issues.
My boss had this meeting with me and told me not to do my job,
to just stamp the paperwork off.
Of course, I knew that was bogus.
GATES: He had access to documents
he wasn't supposed to have access to, but he did.
I mean, you're talking about
the second biggest defense contractor in the United States
with big cyber capabilities. (chuckles)
And this machinist
was logging in to the presentations of the CEO
and giving them to me. (laughs)
I repeatedly told Gerry, "Look, be careful."
He just completely ignored me.
NEWSWOMAN: Eastman worked for Boeing for 18 years.
He was arrested at his desk.
He's been charged with computer trespassing,
and, if convicted, he faces up to four years in prison.
GATES: Anybody who worked at Boeing who talked to me privately
is breaking the company rules
and is in serious trouble.
NEWSMAN: Gerald Eastman was in King County court today
for his arraignment, where he pleaded not guilty.
He says Boeing was not taking his safety concerns seriously
and that is why he went public with what he found.
You know, I got together, you know, and said to my wife, I said...
(sighs heavily)
"I have to go public, you know, so-- regardless of the threat to me."
GATES: After he was arrested, he settled with Boeing
and he never worked in aerospace again.
I didn't hear from him in a long time,
and I wondered, "What's going on?"
I was worried.
Later, I learned from a friend of his
that he had taken his own life.
NEWSWOMAN 2: Do you ever look back and say,
"I wish I would've just kept my mouth shut"?
(sighs) No.
There's-there's thousands of people like-- at Boeing that do that every day,
and some of us have to step forward.
(vehicle alarm chirps)
(engine starts)
♪ ♪
MICHELLE PIERSON: I'm anxious.
We have friends and family that work or have worked at Boeing,
and-and my dad worked at Boeing after he retired from the Navy as well,
and we felt proud to be part of that.
And so this is hard 'cause you feel like you're squealing.
And I know it's not. He's not.
He's just trying to shed light on something
that can be made better and safer.
But I'm hoping that people understand
the reasons behind why he's doing this.
KURIA: It would be different if you knew this was a one-off, this is it,
this is the last time this would happen.
But there's the angst and anticipation for another crash to happen.
This first six minutes of every flight are extremely difficult.
Not just for me but for all the families.
Every time there's turbulence, the first thought is,
"Is this the end?
"Like...
am I gonna die?"
But my dad would go anywhere for me.
That's why I have to go.
To make sure that the world knows
planes are not as safe as we think they are.
(electronic bell chimes)
♪ ♪
(electronic bell chimes)
PILOT (over P.A.): Folks, we'd like to welcome all of you to Washington, D.C.
(indistinct chatter)
So glad you're here.
-Good to see you. -Yeah.
-We made it, guys. -Yeah. -Yeah.
We made it.
I've met so many families from 35 different countries.
We see the same pain in each other's eyes.
PAUL NJOROGE: While all your lives moved on,
for the last six months, our lives,
the lives of the families of the victims
has not moved an inch.
KURIA: Grief, loss and pain are a universal language that everybody speaks.
JOAN VINCENT: Grief has been, uh, profound,
and, uh, I feel best when I'm outdoors.
My daughter was a... a conservationist.
(sobs softly)
(voice breaking): And I know that was her, um, happy place.
KURIA: And I think that the way that we can fight for their legacy...
...is to make sure that no other family is in the same position as we are.
DeFAZIO: The families, they're critical,
putting a face on these crashes.
Since the plane was built here,
since the plane was certified here,
they knew that they had to focus on the United States government
and on Boeing to fix this problem.
CHRIS MOORE: It was quite evident that things were rushed.
In fact, they were continuing to make the airplanes after the second crash.
That's the biggest slap in the face to every single family.
KURIA: My mission out of this is
to make sure that, when people get on a flight,
that they get off on the other side.
PIERSON: There's a lot of, lot of, lot of things swirling around in my head.
It's...
It has been a-- I have-- it's been--
I've been obsessed by it, and I-I didn't really intend to be.
I'm not-- I don't consider myself...
MICHELLE: That's the first time I've heard you say that.
Well, I know I've been obsessed with kind of-- 'cause I want to, you know...
...make sure it never happens again.
So...
♪ ♪
I still have nightmares, but fighting back has been a powerful motivator.
-I mean, I'm finally getting it, but... -MICHELLE: Just one more step.
Yeah. I know.
I'd like to think that the families know that there's people out there
that are still trying to get to the truth.
NEWSMAN: Today, appearing before the House Transportation Committee
is a Boeing whistleblower, Edward Pierson.
Pierson says he thinks that production problems contributed to the MAX crashes.
KURIA: We need answers,
we need accountability, and we need someone to take responsibility.
HAVIAN: The reporters will try to question you.
They'll shout questions at you that'll be provocative.
Don't respond to it.
-(busy chatter) -(cameras clicking)
MICHELLE: You're gonna do this right now?
HAVIAN: Guys, if you could give him some space, that would be great.
Can we just have a moment?
Yeah.
-Why did the FAA not... -(busy chatter continues)
-You're gonna have to ask them... -MICHELLE: We're coming in.
PIERSON: My name is Ed Pierson.
I would first like to provide my heartfelt condolences
for all the families and friends who lost loved ones
on Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
Your loss and grief are truly unimaginable.
I believe production problems at the Renton factory
may have contributed to these two tragic crashes.
I formally warned Boeing leadership in writing on multiple occasions,
specifically once before the Lion Air crash
and again before the Ethiopian Airlines crash,
about potential airplane risk.
Those warnings were ignored.
On June 9, 2018, while the Lion Air airplane was being produced,
four months before it crashed,
I wrote an email to the 737 general manager
advising him to shut down the production line.
When I mentioned that I've seen operations in the military
shut down for lesser safety concerns,
I will never forget his response, which was,
"The military isn't a profit-making organization."
(quiet murmuring, gasping)
Less than a month later, on March 10, 2019,
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed, killing 157 people.
The U.S. regulators' investigation of these crashes
has been as disappointing as Boeing's insistence
that it had no systemic quality or safety issues.
Thank you again for providing me this opportunity.
I'm ready to answer your questions.
Okay. I recognize, uh, Representative Norton.
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON: Would you favor the FAA going farther
and doing an investigation of U.S. Boeing factories?
PIERSON: I fully support that.
I was there for three years, and-and honestly I never saw--
I never met an FAA employee in my three years.
And I never actually remember any of my employees
saying they talked to an FAA employee.
Now, they may have been there, but they certainly weren't visible and present.
And I-I really think that's necessary.
Uh, I'm gonna suggest that, uh, as, uh-- following this hearing.
It is gonna be on us if we do not take the steps
to systematically look at Boeing factories across the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
♪ ♪
(cameras clicking)
DeFAZIO: The Federal Aviation Administration,
they are tasked with the job of keeping the public safe
and, uh, making sure that things that we certify to fly
are gonna fly and not crash.
WOMAN: Administrator Dickson, you're our hope.
You are our hope.
STEVE DICKSON: Aviation's hard lessons and the hard work in response to those lessons
have paved the way to creating a global aviation system
with an enviable safety record.
But we recognize that
safety is a journey, not a destination,
and we must build on the lessons learned,
and we must never allow ourselves to become complacent.
Thank you, and I'm happy to take your questions.
Mr. Dickson, um, do you know who Ed Pierson is?
DICKSON: Uh, I have not met him personally, but I know, I know of him.
-He's sitting right over there. -Yeah.
SEAN MALONEY: I mean, are you aware that four months before the first crash,
he brought these problems to Boeing's attention?
Are you aware of that, gentlemen?
-Four months before the first crash. -I know that there were, uh, con--
yes, that, uh, that concerns were raised, yes.
MALONEY: That's right. And you know what they did?
They sat on it until a second plane crash.
That's what happened.
A bunch more people lost their lives.
So my question to you is:
Will you investigate the production problems at the Renton facility?
Uh, I know that there's ongoing activity through our-our, uh, our oversight.
MALONEY: Sir, sir, I'm sorry, that's not good enough.
Are we gonna interview the production workers at the Renton facility?
Is it gonna be a real thing?
DICKSON: You have my commitment that we are looking into those problems
and we will continue to do so.
Will you commit, as we sit here today, that you will interview Mr. Pierson?
Absolutely.
MALONEY: Will you, will you investigate
-the production problems at the Renton facility? -Yes.
The committee stands adjourned.
(indistinct chatter)
(camera clicking)
Thank you so much. That took courage.
You're doing the right thing by making sure it gets fixed
and no other family has to go through this. Thank you.
Thank you.
-Thank you very much, sir. -Yeah.
Thank you.
-(indistinct chatter) -(cameras clicking)
HAVIAN: If you could give him some space, that would be great.
Happy to-- if you have any questions, I'm happy to answer them for you,
but I think that's all for today.
Well, nobody wants to fly on those planes.
That was really amazing.
PIERSON: The FAA just got directed to go and-and investigate the factory.
And, yeah, this was a big win.
NEWSWOMAN: The story we are following tonight:
Boeing has fired its CEO, Dennis Muilenburg.
NEWSMAN: Muilenburg had presided over one of the worst years in Boeing's history.
REPORTER: 346 people died. Can you answer a few questions?
NEWSWOMAN 2: How much did he walk away with?
(over computer): $62.2 million.
That may sound like a lot, but he's not taking his 2019 bonus.
But the new guy, the new CEO, David Calhoun,
he will be making 1.4 million
with the added benefit of making millions more in bonuses,
including seven million-- just seven million alone--
if he gets the MAX back in the air.
And since we're talking about...
KURIA: There is no remorse in this for Boeing.
Just financial targets.
And I think for me,
thinking about Muilenburg and my dad,
knowing they were two men born the same year,
one is living a lavish lifestyle with millions of dollars,
and the other paid for it with his blood.
♪ ♪
GREEN: So the FAA is under fire, and I think rightfully so,
but it's crazy because the-- Boeing's main defense
is that it can't be liable because the airplane is certified by the FAA.
ROSE: Every plane that's ever crashed has been certified.
-Right. -So that kind of answers the question,
uh, no, certification is not safety.
GREEN: The FAA's position
is that the certification standard should provide immunity to-to the manufacturer,
but the FAA's position also is that manufacturers,
their responsibility extends beyond just meeting the certification standards.
MEGAN BENETT: If the only pressure
on your profit margin is legal liability,
and if you remove the risk of legal liability, because once it's certified,
you're no longer going to be able to be sued
by people who are killed or injured by your aircraft,
there's no longer any motivation for the aircraft companies,
for the designers, the manufacturers, to design anything safely.
The only motivation is to design something that's certifiable.
It doesn't really make sense.
Then there is no-- there's no safety for the flying public.
(jet engine roaring in distance)
-HAVIAN: We got to go. -PIERSON: Yeah, we got to go.
-MICHELLE: Okay. -All right, babe.
-Okay. -I will call you when we can,
-and we'll-- Okay. -Good luck.
Love you.
(sighs)
MICHELLE: Naively, I thought that he would do his bit
at the hearing and then it would be over,
and so not the case.
And it-- I mean, it literally dawned on me that moment like,
"Oh, my God, this is not the end of it.
We're just, we're just... This is the tip of the iceberg."
And that's exactly what it was.
♪ ♪
PIERSON: Finally got the interview with the FAA.
Now I'm going to tell them what was going on in the factory.
I think that's it, that giant facility down there.
-HAVIAN: Yeah. -I believe.
(phone chimes)
(phone clicking)
(message swooshes)
♪ ♪
(phone chimes)
That's my source.
(phone clicking)
(message swooshes)
I'll see you later.
This source approached me in 2007.
At the time, I actually met with half a dozen FAA safety engineers.
You know, I'm not taking my usual car
because some sources that I've worked with have been followed.
(engine revving)
I give them a number of a burner phone that I bought with cash
so that the phone's untraceable.
Nobody here yet.
(gearshift clicks)
PIERSON: The thing that really jumps out for me
is, during the interview, I was always giving them examples
of production problems that I was seeing in the factory,
one of the gentlemen would lit-literally finish my-my thoughts.
And as I said, you know, "And-and then this led to,"
and he would, he would actually finish my statement.
So either the FAA did know and they didn't do anything about it
or they didn't know and it's inexcusable how they could not know.
PIERSON: And-and I-- the part I can't get past my brain is, you know,
you have 45,000 FAA employees,
you have 1,600 of them in that building that we were at,
and they can only assign five people
15 minutes away down the street at the busiest factory in the world?
I mean, give me a break.
I just hope that they do what they say they're gonna do
and go back and do a deeper investigation and...
It's-it's gonna require someone to force them to do it, I-I worry.
♪ ♪
(horn honks)
(vehicle door opens)
(vehicle door closes)
GATES: Thanks for coming.
MAN (voice garbled): Yeah.
GATES: In terms of change at the FAA,
is there a culture shift as a result of what happened on the MAX?
Have people's attitudes changed?
One of our engineers turned in a safety report,
and the manager was upset.
Because now you've got a delay in the program,
and it's all going to impact the program's schedule,
and managers retaliate.
And so the people that I talk to said that they have not seen
any change.
There's some real problems with the organization.
In all fairness, we went through ten years
of just absolutely amazing safety level.
But then there was a lot of complacency, both in industry and at the agency.
And Boeing has huge influence politically.
A lot of money put into lobbying Congress.
And it just shows the acceptance of the Boeing...
the Boeing position on things,
because the agency and Congress,
they are focused on enabling industry,
and I think the belief system is that is safe enough.
♪ ♪
GREEN: The wall between the FAA and the industry is a very low wall.
There's-there's a lot of back-and-forth movement.
It really often is a revolving door.
People who work for Boeing, who then
go into the FAA.
You also see people at the FAA looking to go into Boeing.
And what ends up happening
is the FAA really becomes part of the Boeing team.
DeFAZIO: I was very frustrated by the FAA.
They were way less cooperative than Boeing.
They refer to
the regulated entities as their customers.
No, they're not your customers.
They are a private interest that sometimes will cut corners
to get a competitive edge.
And sometimes those corners they cut kill people.
During this investigation,
we found out something which I think changed everything.
After the first crash was a report
that the FAA had produced about the MCAS system.
That report said that, unless the MCAS was modified,
15 of these planes will crash during the life of the fleet.
We've never allowed anything like that into the air before in history.
You don't do that.
Who saw that report? How was it circulated?
Why didn't they then act to ground the planes,
as opposed to waiting until, uh, another plane full of people crash?
(quiet chatter)
KURIA: After the first crash, they estimated
15 crashes in the lifespan of the plane.
FAA leadership, Boeing leadership,
(voice breaking): they knew this before this plane was made,
before it was put together,
and they did nothing.
That's what makes it so heartbreaking.
When you realize, like, how preventable it was.
(man singing somber song in foreign language over speakers)
-(singing continues) -(quiet sobbing)
(woman singing somber song in foreign language)
(singing continues)
-(woman singing and sobbing) -(people sobbing)
(crowd singing)
(crowd continues singing and sobbing)
♪ ♪
PIERSON: This is gonna be a really interesting hearing.
And this got to go here.
...of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.
There we go.
The aircraft involved in both accidents
was the Boeing 737 MAX.
It is hard not to conclude
your team at the FAA has attempted to keep us in the dark.
Administrator Dickson, I hold you responsible for this.
I expect to receive an explanation today at this hearing for the failure to comply
-with the committee's request. -Yeah, just make some excuses.
DICKSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I-I always appreciate the opportunity for dialogue.
I will not sign off on this aircraft until all FAA technical reviews are complete.
I also intend to pilot the aircraft myself
before the FAA makes any ungrounding decision.
-There we go. -(laughs)
Just bravado.
You got pi-- you have test pilots.
You don't have to fly it yourself.
Talk about j-just tone-deaf.
ROGER WICKER: Senator Markey.
EDWARD MARKEY: Boeing is now arguing in court
that the FAA's certification of the 737 MAX should shield it from liability.
Do you support Boeing's position,
or should the victims' families be able to hold Boeing accountable?
Uh, Senator, I'm not in a position to comment on that.
Uh, but I would certainly be willing to-to follow up with you
-on-on that, uh, question. -WICKER: Senator Cruz.
TED CRUZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Did Boeing lie to the FAA?
DICKSON: I can't say.
I-I can't say.
I mean, I-- definitely there was incomplete, uh, information
and fragmented information that was provided.
-That's bullshit. -CRUZ: Did the FAA screw up
in certifying the 737 MAX?
I have concerns, I would say, that there were mistakes made, yes.
Come on, Senator.
In Washington, the passive voice
is a great way of avoiding responsibility.
Who made the mistakes and why?
The-the, uh, the manufacturer made mistakes,
and the FAA made mistakes in its, in its oversight of the manufacturer.
And what were the mistakes and why were they made?
DICKSON: The full implications
of the, uh, flight control system were not understood, uh,
-as design changes were made. -Come on.
CRUZ: Has anyone at FAA been fired?
Uh, no one has been fired over this particular matter,
um, up to this point, but...
CRUZ: Has anyone been disciplined over this matter?
No, not specifically.
So, unknown somebodies made unspecified mistakes
for which there have been no repercussions?
-Zero accountability. -You understand, sir,
you do not work for Boeing, you work for the American people.
WICKER: With that,
this hearing is now adjourned.
(gavel knocks)
Who got fired?
Nobody. Who got demoted? Nobody.
This is our government, our government.
This is our government in action.
Just ridiculous.
Come on, Jordan. Let's go for a walk.
Come on. At least you don't work for the government.
♪ ♪
It's bullshit.
(door opens)
MICHELLE: I think he sort of owns it and feels very, very guilty,
maybe responsible a little bit for the deaths of these people,
and it's very difficult to watch him, 'cause he's not.
I thought he was doing a time line
mostly of just the things that he had done.
But this is everything.
PIERSON: I am beyond pissed.
It should not be that hard to get the FAA to do their damn job.
But you still have the Department of Justice investigation going on,
so it's not over yet.
♪ ♪
GATES: As part of the Department of Justice investigation,
Boeing was forced to release some documents.
Instant messages and emails between a couple of pilots at Boeing
that's completely off script,
and they're saying things Boeing would never have wanted to see the light of day.
And we're reading them, and you're realizing as a journalist,
"Oh, my God, readers are gonna be outraged."
Boeing's chief technical pilot, Mark Forkner,
saw it as his job to dissuade airlines and regulators all over the world
from wanting extra training for the pilots.
GREEN: This guy Forkner, he is doing it because, higher up at the company,
they decided that a major program goal
was not to require pilot training.
This was a business competitive advantage and was very important to Boeing.
GATES: Boeing had promised
pilots who flew the old model 737 could transition to
this MAX model with minimal training--
two hours on an iPad.
Seriously, an iPad.
Boeing had written into the contract with Southwest a guarantee:
"You will not have to train your pilots on the simulator,
"and if you do, we'll pay you a million dollars per airplane.
That's how seriously we're taking this."
And there was a-a chilling moment when I got in the middle of the document
and I saw this exchange and I realized
that Forkner was telling his deputy, Patrick Gustavsson,
that he had, that day, managed to dissuade Lion Air...
...not to have simulator training for its pilots.
Lion Air did actually ask for more training,
and Boeing went out of its way to stop them from getting it.
Mark Forkner tells his deputy,
"I just Jedi mind tricked these fools."
What we also learned was that MCAS was changed
in a way that was gonna be a real problem,
and if the FAA knew about it, they were gonna change the training requirements.
So these two guys at that moment, under pressure from senior managers,
caved and-and decided not to tell the FAA.
"The airplane," meaning the MAX,
"The airplane is designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys."
This is bad engineering.
It's bad safety.
It's devastating consequences.
And after the MAX wrapped,
these guys were given an award by Boeing
because they delivered exactly
what their bosses had wanted.
What's Boeing going to do to answer this mess?
We don't know, but I would expect criminal charges.
NEWSWOMAN: The U.S. now has its first confirmed case
of the deadly new coronavirus.
HOLT: The Dow dropping more than 2,300 points.
NEWSMAN: Airports and airlines devastated.
This airport is empty. The parking lot is empty.
WOMAN (over P.A.): ...at all times until they are checked.
(jackhammers rattling in distance)
GATES: Because of the COVID-19 crisis,
what we have is a company that's in terrible shape business-wise.
NEWSMAN 2: Boeing, the number one component
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, in a freefall at this moment.
GATES: So they really depend on the 737 MAX getting back
to get cash flow coming again.
TRUMP: We have to help Boeing. We have to help the airline industry.
It wasn't their fault. This wasn't their fault.
GATES: It has to work
or Boeing can't keep going.
(typing)
♪ ♪
(ringtone plays)
Yeah.
-(stammers) Um, what about the... -(dog barks)
-Are you sure? -(dog barks)
(fire crackling)
(sighs softly)
♪ ♪
PIERSON: Today, we're gonna watch the FAA administrator fly the MAX
on a test flight.
This is one of the last steps apparently before the plane gets recertified.
Why is he touching
the plane like...
literally just a clown in a suit?
PIERSON: Well, he made a big deal, saying, you know,
"I'm not gonna approve this plane unless I-I fly it myself."
Sitting up there, you know, what is he really gonna test? Uh, come on.
GATES: So wh-where is the plane right now?
Is-is that it right there?
(jet engine whirring)
There she goes.
♪ ♪
(jet engine roaring)
♪ ♪
You seeing anything yet?
(cameras clicking)
(indistinct radio chatter)
-Well, that's him. -MAN: Yeah. -(camera clicking)
DICKSON: Good morning, and thank you for joining us today.
We're in the homestretch,
but that doesn't mean that we're gonna take shortcuts to get it done...
GREEN: Boeing stock's up three dollars right now.
MAN: Which is twice before the Dickson press conference started.
DICKSON: ...the plane for return to passenger service.
GATES: Steve, uh, I'd like to ask you a question that actually comes from
one of the families of the victims in an email this morning,
and it's something that the-the families have been repeating.
They say today's flight is a public relations stunt, a gift to Boeing.
DICKSON: This is not a publicity stunt.
This is simply, uh, the fulfillment of a commitment, a promise that I made,
uh, within my first few weeks at the FAA.
The 737 aircraft--
and statistically it may be the safest airplane that's ever been built.
You know, as I've said many times, safety's a journey,
and it is something that we need to continue...
The FAA is supposed to be our watchdog, our guardian and our protector.
It doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense.
Doesn't make sense to me.
At all.
(sighs heavily)
♪ ♪
(printer beeps, whirs)
GATES: This is a settlement as a result of the DOJ's grand jury investigation.
MONIQUE MING LAVEN: Boeing avoided criminal prosecution
for criminal misconduct today
for giving the FAA false information about the 737 MAX.
NEWSMAN: As part of this agreement, which is, by the way,
what many people on Wall Street expected,
Boeing has agreed to pay more than $2.5 billion.
NEWSMAN 2: That fine's only a slap on the wrist
when you consider the severity of the charges.
GREEN: Boeing had a problem.
They dealt with the problem working with the government.
They together crafted this announcement that basically said,
"Look, we're responsible...
"...but only because we had some bad apples,
"and the bad apples didn't have senior management.
It was these guys."
These two guys were guilty,
pilots from the internal Boeing emails,
Mark Forkner and his deputy Patrick Gustavsson.
They've been thrown to the wolves here.
Forkner does what he's told,
and now he's basically being left as a scapegoat for what Boeing did.
And the DOJ actually went out of their way--
and this is not normal--
they explicitly say
that senior management didn't do anything.
All of the senior management at Boeing are off scot-free,
and not only scot-free but, you know,
with their huge million-dollar salaries all intact and no threat to them at all.
(line rings)
ROSE (over speakerphone): Hey. I'm on a call. Can I call you back?
GREEN: Yeah. Just come by when you're done.
ROSE: All right.
GREEN: It's really annoying that Boeing is able to pay money
to avoid criminal responsibility,
but honestly it's great for the case 'cause we make the same allegations
that the government now has settled with Boeing,
and that is essentially Boeing defrauded the FAA.
These guys, um, Forkner and Gustavsson, are the two technical pilots.
They do what they're doing because they're under orders from above,
but the guys above, the executives who gave the order, they got away with it.
And that frankly goes back to this whistleblower
that we've been talking about, Ed Pierson.
(ship horn blowing in distance)
PIERSON: After the first crash, I wrote to the CEO.
"You need to know we got to stop and do the job properly."
Right after that, I wrote to the board of directors.
And it was a certified letter
'cause I wanted to make sure that it was documented.
I was pleading with them to act.
And then, a couple weeks later, the Ethiopian Airline crashes.
Pierson comes along and he says, "That's not just those two guys.
"I went to Muilenburg and said there are real problems on the assembly line,
manufacturing process."
So you begin to develop a larger picture of a corporate attitude
to put money and, uh, profit above safety.
Everybody in the Boeing organization says,
"Safety first, safety first, safety first."
Is that true?
Is that true or is that a canard? Is that baloney?
Right now, I like the idea of, uh, getting Pierson, uh, on paper.
GREEN: Yeah. Put it this way:
Boeing doesn't want him to testify, so we should... (laughs)
we should react to that by getting him to testify.
♪ ♪
(siren wailing in distance)
GATES: Oh, hold on. Boeing's calling me.
Hi-- Hi, Bernard. How are you doing?
No-- No problem.
So, what'd you-- what did you want to tell me?
No, but wh-wh... (groans)
(page turns)
I understand.
Mm-hmm.
♪ ♪
All right, Bernard, well, thanks for the call, and I'll talk to you later.
Bye.
(sighs)
Well, we-we have the heads-up basically.
The FAA's gonna clear the MAX to fly again on Wednesday.
It's good news for Boeing
at a very, very low moment.
(line ringing)
-PIERSON: Hello. -MICHELLE (over phone): Hey.
PIERSON: Uh, did you see the news?
MICHELLE: I-I was in Costco, honey. I haven't seen the news.
The FAA just cleared the Boeing MAX to fly.
(Michelle groans)
Well, you knew it was gonna happen.
GREEN: American has these airplanes,
so American as a company is gonna want to fly them.
Okay, that's an Airbus, 737.
Here you go.
MAX 8, 2:30 p.m.
Look at the cost.
You can go at 1:40 for five-fif-- 516 on an Embraer.
I can go at 2:30 for 181 on a MAX.
People looking for deals to go to Miami are gonna end up in a MAX
if they're not careful.
That's crazy.
I can... just tell our PR guy about this.
I don't know. It's-- I got to tell you, I think it's gonna be real when
people are at an airport lining up and being the first ones to-to get on a MAX.
WOMAN (over P.A.): Ladies and gentlemen, at this time...
(woman continues speaking indistinctly over P.A.)
♪ ♪
(electronic bells chime)
WOMAN 2 (over P.A.): Good morning, passengers.
This is the pre-boarding announcement
for American Airlines Flight 718 to Miami, leaving on time.
Boarding begins in 20 minutes. Thank you.
♪ ♪
KURIA: Birthdays and anniversaries tend to be really hard,
so just making sure that, instead of just being sad,
to celebrate Dad, celebrate his laugh,
celebrate his life.
And, um...
-Hey. -Yeah, and I think it's needed
because the 737 MAX is going back up in the air,
and that hurts a lot,
so to feel some form of, like, victory.
Thank you so much.
MAN: That's a beautiful cake.
(electronic bells chime)
WOMAN 2 (over P.A.): This is the final boarding call for passengers
on American Airlines Flight 718 to Miami.
GATES: I've talked to high-level people inside Boeing
who feel a sense of guilt
but they don't believe they did anything deliberately wrong.
The sin wasn't anything deliberate.
It was going along with the system that was there
and not questioning it enough.
This is a very American story because it's the American corporate culture
at the root of what's gone wrong.
What happened within the FAA
in withdrawing further and further from its direct oversight role,
that was just a political move.
Boeing lobbied and paid politicians
and convinced them that they needed to get out of the way of industry.
Boeing said, "We want regulation out of the way.
We'll control it 'cause we're efficient and we can do it ourselves."
PILOT (over P.A.): Flight attendants, prepare for takeoff.
DeFAZIO: Predatory capitalism will kill itself.
And it'll kill people.
This is a sickness that kills
many good American corporations.
The impact of Wall Street on the real economy of the United States of America.
40% of our economy is financed.
They used to be 20%.
They used to lend money to people to make things.
Now they are predating on successful companies
and turning them into a shell of their former selves.
I want to see Boeing go back to being what it was and they could be again:
the greatest engineering company in the world.
(jet engine roaring)
(Kuria singing)
♪ But we're here today ♪
(guitar playing softly)
♪ Didn't see the end through all the pain ♪
♪ But we made it through the storm ♪
♪ Made it through the storm ♪
♪ Grateful for the battles that we won ♪
-(chuckles) -(group humming)
♪ And the ones that we lost, too ♪
-(laughs) -(woman singing softly)
(group vocalizing)
♪ Safe to shore. ♪
♪ ♪
NEWSMAN: Ed Pierson told lawmakers
pressure to produce new planes as fast as possible was undermining safety.
PIERSON: Boeing wasn't listening or the FAA.
The only people that were doing any listening it seemed was Congress.
DANA CANEDY (over computer): The prize is awarded to Dominic Gates,
-(screams) -Steve Miletich, Mike Baker and Lewis Kamb
of The Seattle Times.
(woman speaking indistinctly over P.A.)
NEWSWOMAN: Boeing has finally accepted sole liability
for the fatal crash in Ethiopia.
NEWSWOMAN 2: ...an agreement that also paves way for compensation claims
to be made under U.S. law, which provides for higher levels of compensation.
♪ ♪
KURIA: My dad always used to say you have to live full and die empty.
I'm not there yet.
I'm just starting my journey,
but that's the direction that I'm heading.
♪ ♪
(music fades)